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Abstract 
As fallout from the global financial crisis intensified in October 2008, governments around 
the world sought to implement stabilization measures in order to calm and protect their 
domestic markets. While not directly exposed to the subprime mortgage crisis, the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands announced the creation of the Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (the 
Guarantee Scheme) on October 13, 2008, to boost confidence in interbank lending markets 
and to ensure the flow of credit to Dutch households and companies. In establishing this 
program, the Dutch State Treasury Agency of the Ministry of Finance (DSTA) committed €200 
billion to support the issuance of debt to be guaranteed by the government. Dutch financial 
institutions meeting liquidity and solvency requirements enforced by De Nederlandsche 
Bank, including foreign subsidiaries established in the Netherlands with substantial business 
in the country, were eligible to apply for coverage under the Guarantee Scheme. Initially, only 
newly issued “plain vanilla” commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and fixed- or floating-
rate medium-term notes with maturities of between three months and three years could be 
guaranteed. Additionally, debt instruments would need to be denominated in euros, US 
dollars, or pounds sterling. Between October 23, 2008, and December 1, 2009, the Guarantee 
Scheme was utilized by six Dutch financial institutions for a total utilization of €54.2 billion. 
No guaranteed debt was issued after December 1, 2009. The issuance window, though 
originally set to expire December 31, 2009, was extended twice, to December 31, 2010. No 
institutions defaulted on any guaranteed debt. 
 
Keywords: The Netherlands, short-term debt, medium-term debt, credit institutions, 
government guarantee  
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee 
programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 






At a Glance  
As fallout from the global financial crisis intensified 
in October 2008, governments around the world 
sought to implement stabilization measures to both 
calm and protect their domestic economies. 
Financial institutions in the Netherlands, while not 
as exposed as those in other countries to 
disturbances in the US markets, suffered from 
liquidity shortages stemming from a sharp decrease 
in interbank lending. In response, the Dutch State 
Treasury Agency of the Ministry of Finance (DSTA), 
in cooperation with De Nederlandsche Bank, 
announced the creation of the Dutch Credit 
Guarantee Scheme (the ‘Guarantee Scheme’) on 
October 13, 2008, for the purpose of granting 
government guarantees to banks and financial 
institutions issuing medium-term debt. 
The program was officially implemented on October 
23, 2008, when the DSTA committed €200 billion to 
support the issuance of debt to be guaranteed by the 
government. Dutch financial institutions, including 
foreign subsidiaries with substantial business in the 
country, that met solvency and liquidity 
requirements were eligible to participate. Eligible 
debt initially included non-complex unsecured loans 
limited to plain-vanilla commercial paper, 
certificates of deposit, and fixed- or floating-rate medium-term notes. Debt instruments needed to 
have maturities of between three months and three years and be denominated in euros, US dollars 
(USD), or pounds sterling (GBP). These criteria were later modified on July 7, 2009, to include all 
senior unsecured debt instruments denominated in euros, USD, or GBP with maturities of greater 
than three months and up to five years. In accordance with European Central Bank (ECB) 
recommendations, participation fees were assessed based on an institution’s creditworthiness and 
the maturity of the debt to be guaranteed.  
Between October 23, 2008, and December 1, 2009, the Guarantee Scheme was utilized by six Dutch 
financial institutions for a total utilization of €54.2 billion. The issuance window was set to expire 
December 31, 2009; it was extended twice to close on December 31, 2010. No participating 
institution defaulted. 
Summary Evaluation 
There has not been much formal evaluation of the Guarantee Scheme. However, it has been viewed 
by one source as a successful lender of “last resort” facility for Dutch financial institutions looking 
to bolster their liquidity and interbank lending positions. 
 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To ensure liquidity for Dutch financial 
institutions and, by extension, Dutch households and 
businesses, through the provision of State guarantees 
on non-subordinated, medium-term debt  
Announcement Date  October 13, 2008 
Operational Date October 23, 2008 
Date of First Guaranteed 
Loan Issuance 
October 23, 2008, 
approx. 
Issuance Window 
Expiration Date  
Originally December 31, 
2009; later extended 
twice, to December 31, 
2010 
Program Size €200 billion 
Usage  €54.2 billion by six 
Dutch financial 
institutions in total 
Outcomes No defaults  
Notable Features Up to one year after 
default for the 
guarantee to be realized 
upon 
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810
Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 2 Iss. 3
 
 
Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme:  The Netherlands Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$849.1 billion in 2007 




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$51,733 in 2007 



























$1.0 trillion in total assets in 2007 




Size of banking 
system as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
 
120.2% in 2007 




Size of banking 





Data not available for 2007/2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
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of banking system 
 
94.0% of total banking assets in 2007 
93.0% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




in banking system 
 
10.0% of total banking assets in 2007 
2.0% of total banking assets in 2008 
 








Data not available for 2007/2008  
 
Source: World Bank Group 
 
Existence of deposit 
insurance 
 
Data not available for 2007  
 










As fallout from the global financial crisis intensified in October 2008, governments 
worldwide acted swiftly to calm and protect their domestic markets. The Netherlands sought 
to address the liquidity problems that its “fundamentally sound and viable financial 
institutions” faced under the extraordinary circumstances (European Commission 2008). In 
implementing the Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme, the government hoped to ensure the flow 
of credit to households and businesses at a time when interbank lending had become 
severely restricted. To support specific institutions in need of further assistance between 
late 2008 and 2013, Dutch authorities later enacted individual recapitalization and 
restructuring measures for banks. It was expected that the implementation of the Guarantee 
Scheme would not only encourage interbank lending at a time when the market for medium-
term, non-guaranteed loans had “dried up,” but that the measure itself would help to stabilize 
the Dutch economy in the midst of the global financial crisis (European Commission 2008).  
Program Description 
The Dutch government authorized plans for the creation of the Guarantee Scheme—whose 
design was modeled after the Unied Kingdom’s Credit Guarantee Scheme—on October 13, 
2008. A week later, on October 21, 2008, the Dutch Ministry of Finance notified the European 
Commission of its plans to implement the Guarantee Scheme in response to recent 
disruptions in the global credit markets. The program was officially implemented on October 
23, 2008. Having found its features to be in accordance with State aid rules, the European 
Commission granted approval for the Guarantee Scheme on October 30, 2008.  
The Dutch program was jointly administered by the Dutch State Treasury Agency of the 
Ministry of Finance and De Nederlandsche Bank, the Netherlands’ central bank. According to 
the original terms of the program, the DSTA commited €200 billion to support the issuance 
of debt guaranteed by the government. Participation in the voluntary, opt-in program was 
open to Dutch financial institutions meeting solvency and liquidity standards according to 
the Dutch Financial Markets Supervision Act of 2006, including foreign subsidiaries 
established in the Netherlands with “substantial business in the country” (European 
Commission 2008). Additionally, only one institution in a group was allowed to apply for the 
Guarantee Scheme. De Nederlandsche Bank bore responsibility for ensuring that these 
standards and requirements were met prior to participation in the Guarantee Scheme.   
Initially, only debts with maturities of more than three months and less than three years 
were eligible for coverage under the Guarantee Scheme. Qualifying debt instruments 
included new, non-complex senior unsecured loans—limited to plain-vanilla commercial 
paper, certificates of deposit, and fixed- or floating-rate medium-term notes that could be 
redeemed in a single payment. The terms of the debt instruments could not include any 
provisions for cross-default, cross-acceleration of default, or call option on the principal 
(Ministry of Finance 2008). Though there were no minimum amounts specified for the 
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issuance of individual guarantees, debt instruments were required to be denominated in 
euros, US dollars, or pounds sterling.  
Interested institutions meeting solvency and liquidity requirements applied through the 
DSTA to issue guaranteed debt. Both the government and the participant then signed a 
Guarantee Certificate, a contractual agreement specifying each party’s obligations under the 
Guarantee Scheme. For instance, only one guarantee could be associated with a single debt 
issuance, and the Dutch government reserved the right to cancel coverage under the 
Guarantee Scheme if either the terms of the debt were amended in any way or if the debt 
were issued after the cut-off date specified in the Guarantee Certificate. Additionally, the 
participating bank was required to pay a termination fee to the DSTA if it failed to issue the 
guaranteed debt by the cut-off date agreed upon with the Dutch government.  
Participation fees consisted of a flat fee of 50 basis points on an annual basis and a variable 
fee determined according to an individual bank’s creditworthiness as well as the maturity of 
the debt to be guaranteed. The fee schedule was designed in accordance with the European 
Commission’s “Recommendations on government guarantees on bank debt” of October 20, 
2008.  
The DSTA imposed restrictions on individual participation by limiting any bank’s usage to 
the amount of existing debt maturing between October 23, 2008, and December 31, 2009. 
Participating banks also had to comply with a series of conditions designed to prevent abuse 
of the Guarantee Scheme, including limits on marketing the Guarantee Scheme as a 
commercial advantage, executive compensation, and severances packages. There was also a 
limit placed on growth in balance sheet volume, which was not to exceed the higher 
percentage of “1) the annual growth of nominal GDP in the Netherlands in the previous year, 
2) the average historical growth of the balance sheets in the Netherlands for the period 
1987–2007, or 3) the average growth in balance sheet volume of the EU banking sector in 
the previous six months (European Commission 2008).  
Upon the first event of default, the Dutch government assumed responsibility for 100% of 
principal and interest and paid the lender within three months of the date of default. The 
DSTA was allowed to extend this payment date up to three times under extraordinary 
circumstances.  
On July 7, 2009, the Ministry of Finance notified the European Commission of modifications 
to the original terms of the Guarantee Scheme. Under the amended conditions, eligibility was 
expanded to include all senior unsecured debt instruments with maturities of up to five 
years. Relatedly, the DSTA committed up to €66.6 billion (i.e., one third of the total budget) 
for debt instruments with maturities of greater than three years; individual caps for banks 
issuing guaranteed debt with maturities of greater than three years was further limited to 
€22.2 billion (i.e., a third of a third of the total budget).  
The July 7, 2009, modifications also provided more detailed requirements for participation 
regarding corporate governance and compensation. Rather than unconditionally restricting 
executive bonuses and other incentives, participating banks would need to introduce and 
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maintain a sustainable remuneration policy, ensure that severance payments for members 
of the Board were limited to one year’s fixed salary, and adhere to the provisions of the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code when distributing bonus packages.  
On December 17, 2009, the Ministry of Finance notified the European Commission of further 
modifications to the Guarantee Scheme. First, the issuance window was extended from 
December 31, 2009 to June 30, 2010. Second, the flat fee included in the participation fee 
increased from 50 basis points (bps) to 70 bps for all guaranteed debt instruments. For debt 
instruments with a maturity of over 12 months, the variable fee also increased as a result of 
the change in reference period used to calculate credit default swap (CDS) spreads.3  
On June 29, 2010, the Ministry of Finance notified the European Commission of two 
additional modifications to the Guarantee Scheme prompted by the European Commission’s 
April 30, 2010 guidelines for the phase-out of guarantee programs. First, the fixed 
participation fee increased for all credit rating categories according to a progressive scale, 
ranging from 75 bps for banks with triple-A ratings to 110 bps for banks with ratings lower 
than A minus. Additionally, the Ministry of Finance needed to undertake a viability review 
for each institution whose total outstanding guaranteed debt (as of July 1, 2010) exceeded 
both a ratio of 5% of total liabilities and a total of €500 million. The Ministry of Finance was 
then be required to submit such reports to the European Commission within three months 
of a new debt issuance or rollover by a participating bank (European Commission 2010a).   
Outcomes 
Although the Guarantee Scheme issuance window was originally set to expire on December 
31, 2009, it was prolonged two times, in each case for a period of six months, closing on 
December 31, 2010.   
Between October 23, 2008, and December 1, 2009, the Guarantee Scheme was utilized by six 
Dutch financial institutions.4 These were not exclusively the six largest banks in the 
Netherlands— although large banks SNS, ING, and Fortis accounted for well over half of 
utilization—but rather the ones facing the greatest liquidity pressures (Leal 2011). 
LeasePlan Corp. N.V.. a fleet management company held mainly by Volkswagen Group, and 
Achmea Hypotheekbank N.V., a mortgage company, complied with the conditions set forth 
in the original terms of the Guarantee Scheme and were deemed eligible to issue guaranteed 
debt despite their non-bank status.  
The following table (Figure 1) details the usage of the Guarantee Scheme up to December 1, 
2009, after which no debt was issued under the program. This slowdown was due in part to 
the improving conditions in global markets and, consequently, the steady return of non-
 
3 The ECB’s “Recommendations” previously referenced the period between January 1, 2007, to August 31, 
2008, but the Netherlands updated the reference period to reflect CDS spreads calculated for the period 
between March 1, 2008, to November 1, 2009.  
4 Achmea Hypotheekbank N.V., Fortis Bank Ned. (Holding) N.V., ING Bank N.V., LeasePlan Corp. N.V., NIBC 
Bank N.V., and SNS Bank N.V. 
815
Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme Engbith
 
 
guaranteed debt issuance as well as the “revival of equity issuance aimed at market 
investors” (Levy and Schich 2010).  
Figure 1: Operation of the Guarantee Scheme up to December 1, 2009 










2.2 2.2 4.1 4.2 
SNS 5.7 5.7 10.6 11.0 
NIBC 6.8 6.4 12.6 12.3 
LeasePlan 7.6 7.2 14.1 13.9 
ING 12.8 12.4 23.7 23.9 
Fortis 18.9 18.0 35.0 34.7 





Source: Dutch Ministry of Finance.  
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Guarantee Scheme was implemented by the Dutch government as one of many 
stabilization measures announced in response to the global financial crisis. 
Other interventions, implemented independently throughout an extended period spanning 
from late 2008 through 2013, included individual capitalization, investment, and 
restructuring measures for major Dutch banks such as Aegon, ING, and SNS REAAL. A 
majority of the later actions were taken in response to deteriorating conditions exacerbated 
by the European sovereign debt crisis.  
2. The program drew its legal basis from the Dutch Financial Markets Supervision Act 
of 2006. 
Existing Dutch law thus provided the authority for the Guarantee Scheme. 
3. In accordance with State aid rules, European Commission approval was required 
for the implementation of the Guarantee Scheme.   
The European Commission authorized the Guarantee Scheme on October 30, 2008.  As 
discussed in more detail below, the need to structure the Guarantee Scheme in such a way 
as to ensure EC approval significantly influenced the design of certain program features. 
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4. Up to €200 billion could be guaranteed under the program. 
Program documents do not provide a specific rationale for this amount.  
5. Eligibility for the Guarantee Scheme was restricted to Dutch banks that met 
liquidity and solvency requirements.  
The Guarantee Scheme as announced provided for eligibility for all banks with substantial 
operations in the Netherlands. Banks would have to meet certain liquidity and solvency 
requirements as specified in the Dutch Financial Markets Supervision Act of 2006. Included 
among eligible institutions were foreign subsidiaries established in the Netherlands deemed 
by De Nederlandsche Bank to have met the substantial operations test (European 
Commission 2008a).  Applicants to the program needed explicit approval from De 
Nederlandsche Bank before applying for coverage under the Guarantee Scheme. 
As noted in the Outcomes section, LeasePlan Corp. N.V., a fleet management company held 
mainly by Volkswagen Group, and Achmea Hypotheekbank N.V., a mortgage company, 
complied with the conditions set forth in the original terms of the Guarantee Scheme and 
were deemed eligible to issue guaranteed debt despite their non-bank status. 
6. Initially, new non-complex senior unsecured loans limited to plain-vanilla 
commercial paper, certificates of deposits, and fixed- or floating-rate bullet 
medium-term notes were eligible for coverage under the Guarantee Scheme. 
On July 7, 2009, the European Commission approved a request by the Dutch Ministry of 
Finance to expand eligibility to include all senior unsecured debt instruments.  
7. Initially, debt ranging in maturity from three months to three years could be issued 
under the Guarantee Scheme. 
The July 7, 2009, modifications expanded eligibility to include debt with maturities up to five 
years. Relatedly, the Dutch government committed one third of the total budget (i.e., €66.6 
billion) for the granting of guarantees for debt with maturities over three years. An 
individual limit of one third of this designated amount (i.e., €22.2 billion) was imposed on 
banks issuing guaranteed debt with maturities greater than three years.  
8. Eligibility was restricted to debt denominated in euros, US dollars, and pounds 
sterling.  
Program documents do not provide a specific rationale for limiting eligibility to these 
currencies. 
9. The Ministry of Finance imposed individual caps according to the amount of debt 
already issued by each participating institution.   
Participating institutions were not allowed to issue guaranteed debt in excess of the amount 
of existing debt maturing between October 23, 2008, and December 31, 2009.  
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10. The fee for issuing debt pursuant to the Guarantee Scheme varied based on the 
soundness of the issuing institution and the maturity of the debt guaranteed.  
The guarantee fee was determined according to the guidelines presented in the European 
Central Bank’s “Recommendations on government guarantees on bank debt” of October 20, 
2008. Guarantees for debts with any length of maturity incurred a flat fee of 50 bps. In 
addition, variable charges for guaranteed debt with maturities over 12 months were 
calculated using the lower of either the median five-year CDS spread for that institution from 
January 1, 2007, to August 31, 2008, or the median five-year CDS spread based on a 
comparison with peer group members with a similar rating over the same period. For banks 
without representative CDS spreads but with a credit rating, fees were calculated in 
accordance with peer group members’ ratings over the same period.  Banks without either 
CDS spreads or credit ratings incurred fees based on De Nederlandsche Bank’s regulatory 
assessment (European Commission 2008).  
Participation fees were later increased with the December 17, 2009 (see Figure 2), 
modification and prolongation of the Guarantee Scheme. The flat fee for guaranteeing debt 
of any maturity increased from 50 bps to 70 bps. Additionally, the variable fees for 
guaranteeing debt instruments with maturities over 12 months increased due to a change in 
the period used to calculate CDS spreads, from January 1, 2007 to August 31, 2008 as 
referenced in the European Central Bank’s “Recommendations on government guarantees 
on bank debt,” to March 1, 2008–November 1, 2009 (European Commission 2009a).  
Figure 2: Participation Fees as of December 17, 2009 
Rating Fixed fee Variable fee  
(CDS spreads) 
Total fee 
AAA 70 bps 53 bps 123 bps 
AA 70 bps 68 bps 138 bps 
A 70 bps 73 bps 143 bps 





Source: Dutch Ministry of Finance.  
On June 29, 2010, the Dutch Ministry of Finance once again increased the fixed component 
of the participation fee for all credit rating categories according to a progressive scale (see 
Figure 3), ranging from 75 basis points for banks with triple-A ratings to 110 basis points for 
banks with ratings lower than A minues (European Commission 2010b). This followed new 
guidelines from the European Commission issued on April 30, 2010, that called for an 
increase in guarantee fees for programs still in operation, with the objectives of better 
matching market conditions and incentivizing firms to shift to non-guarantee issuance as 
soon as possible. 
  
818




Figure 3: Participation Fees as of June 29, 2010  
Rating Fixed Fee Variable Fee  
(CDS spreads) 
Total fee 
AAA   75 bps 53 bps 128 bps 
AA   80 bps 63 bps 148 bps 
A or A+   85 bps 73 bps 158 bps 
A-   90 bps 73 bps 163 bps 





Source: Dutch Ministry of Finance.  
All fees were to be paid on annual basis within forty days of the issuance of guaranteed debt.  
A bank that failed to issue debt that it had successfully applied to have covered under the 
Guarantee Scheme was subject to a termination fee. This termination fee was equal to the 
participation fee that was to have been charged for each debt issuance.   
11. The Ministry of Finance imposed broad conditions for participation, including 
restrictions on growth in balance sheet volume, executive compensation, and 
severance packages and the marketing of the Guarantee Scheme.  
Guidance issued by the European Commission in October 2008 on the creation of credit 
guarantee programs called for the inclusion in programs of a set of safeguards “to minimize 
. . . distortions and the potential abuse of the preferential situations of beneficiaries brought 
about by a State guarantee” and “to avoid moral hazard.”  This guidance did not specify 
exactly what safeguards a program should include, but required “an adequate combination” 
of elements including restrictions on advertising based on the guarantee, balance sheet 
growth, share buybacks and executive compensation some of which the Dutch adopted. 
(European Commission 2008). 
Growth in balance sheet volume while taking part in the Guarantee Scheme was not to exceed 
the higher of the following: 
1) The annual growth in nominal GDP in the Netherlands in the previous year; 
2) The average historical growth in balance sheets in the Dutch banking sector for the 
period 1987–2007;   
3) The average percent growth in balance sheet volume of the European Union banking 
sector in the previous six months (European Commission 2009b). 
Although executive compensation and severance package increases were initially restricted 
unconditionally, the July 7, 2009, modifications to the Guarantee Scheme outlined more 
specific requirements whereby participating banks would be required to: 
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1) Introduce and maintain a sustainable remuneration policy;  
2) Ensure that the severance payments for members of the Board of Directors would 
be limited to one year’s fixed salary;  
3) Adhere to the guidelines set forth by the Dutch Corporate Governance Code when 
calculating bonuses (European Commission 2009b).  
12.  As of July 1, 2010, certain participating banks were required to undergo a 
comprehensive review of their activities under the Guarantee Scheme.  
Based on guidelines issued by the European Commission for guarantee programs to be 
continued beyond June 30, 2010, the Dutch authorities instituted a mandatory viability 
review for each bank whose total outstanding guaranteed debt as of July 1, 2010 exceeded 
both a ratio of 5% of total liabilities and a total of €500 million. The Ministry of Finance was 
required to submit such reports to the European Commission within three months of a new 
debt issuance or rollover by a participating bank. This requirement was motivated by the 
European Commission’s belief that market conditions had stabilized sufficiently by mid-
2010 such that a “persistent failure to obtain a considerable proportion of the funding 
needed without government guarantees may indicate a lack of confidence in the viability of 
a bank’s business model.”  Thus, continued heavy reliance on government guarantees 
necessitated an examination of the institution’s business in the Commission’s view 
(European Commission 2010a). 
13. Upon the first event of default, the Dutch State Treasury Authority was required to 
fulfill its guarantee obligations to a participating institution within three months.  
In the event that a participating institution defaulted on its guaranteed debts, the Dutch State 
Treasury Authority would assume responsibility for paying principal and interest through 
maturity and pay all obligations within three months of the date of default. The government 
reserved the right to extend its payment date up to three times under extraordinary 
circumstances (European Commission 2008).  
Per the original terms of the Guarantee Scheme, the guaranteed debt would have to provide 
for the repayment of principal in a single amount. The terms of the debt instruments were 
not permitted to include any allowance for cross-default, cross-acceleration of default, or any 
call option on the principal (Ministry of Finance 2008).  
14. The Guarantee Scheme issuance window was initially set to expire on December 
31, 2009, before being extended to December 31, 2010.  
Although the original terms specified an end date of December 31, 2009, the Guarantee 
Scheme issuance window was prolonged for two periods of six months each. The program’s 
issuance window expired on December 31, 2010.  
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It has been hypothesized that Dutch banks considered the Guarantee Scheme to be a facility 
of “last resort,” and that, given peak utilization totaled only a quarter of the €200 billion 
budget, they were successful in finding alternative sources of emergency funding (Leal 
2011). For instance, according to Leal, the diversity of beneficiaries suggests that large, 
multinational groups may have simultaneously accessed guarantee schemes in several 
countries via their foreign subsidiaries (Leal 2011). The fact that four of the six financial 
institutions issued less guaranteed debt than they had been assigned by the DSTA also 
indicates that institutions may have only applied to the Guarantee Scheme for 
supplementary aid (Leal 2011.).  
All guaranteed debt was issued prior to November 2009, so it is unclear whether the lack of 
program utilization had to do with the fee increases specified in the December 2009 term 
modifications (Leal 2011).  
Leal also found evidence for the positive effect of guaranteed debt issuance on the credit 
spreads of Dutch bonds, particularly for senior unsecured debt issues and subordinated debt 
issues (Leal 2011). However, Leal finds that this may have been accompanied by the 
crowding out of non-guaranteed issuances. 
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